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Scientific Method, AntiFoundationalism, And Public
Decisionmaking
Kristin Shrader-Frechette*
Introduction
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently awarded $85,000 to
a Washington psychiatrist to help "counter the public's 'irrational fear'
about nuclear power." Robert L. DuPont, a former director of the
National Institute on Drug Abuse, received the funds for a study that has
been described as "an attempt to demonstrate that opponents of nuclear
power are mentally ill."l
DOE's fears about public irrationality regarding technological risks,
however, are not atypical. At least three groups of persons maintain that
citizens' worries about environmental risks, from carcinogenic
pesticides to loss of global ozone, are irrational. Industry
spokespersons, risk assessors, and contemporary social scientists have
all attacked the environmental fears of laypeople as irrational. Edith
Efron, for example, author of THE NEWS TWISTERS and THE
APOCALYTICS: POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND THE BIG CANCER LIE,
maintains that both citizens and scientists have attenipted to incriminate
industry in the name of "cancer prevention," even though the evidence
*
Professor Shrader-Frechette received her B.S. from Xavier University (1967)
and Ph.D. from Notre Dame University (1972). She is Graduate Research Professor
of Philosophy, University of South Florida and Editor-in-Chief for the series
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND SCIENCE POLICY, currently being published by
Oxford University Press.
1
Holden, FearofNuclearPower:A Phobia?226 SCIENCE 814 (1984).
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that certain substances cause environmental and human harm is typically
questionable. Public fear of cancer, she says, derives from "warring
attitudes toward the American industrial system" and "fantasies" about
'2
"industrial mass murder."
Risk assessors, often experts in the employ of industries responsible
for the hazardous technologies they are paid to evaluate, constitute a
second class of persons critical of alleged citizen "irrationality." Norman
Rasmussen, for example, author of the most famous risk analysis, of
commercial nuclear reactors, has accused the public of "inconsistency"
in its attitudes toward hazards. 3 On his view, anyone who travels by
automobile, but opposes commercial nuclear fission, is inconsistent in
accepting a large risk but rejecting an allegedly smaller one.4
2
Efron, Behind the Cancer Terror, 16 REASON 23 ff (May 1984). See also,
Efron, THE NEWS TWISTERS [1971) and Efron, THE APOCALYPTICS: POLITICS,
SCIENCE, AND THE BIG CANCER LIE (1984).
3
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U. S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER

PLANTS, REPORT NO. WASH-1400, 37 (1975), hereinafter WASH-1400. See
Braybrooke and Schotch, Cost-Benefit Analysis under the Constraintof Meeting
Needs [Working paper available from D. Baybrook, Dept. Philosophy, Dalhousie
U., Halifax, NS, CANADA B3H 3J5.]
4

Lave, Discussion, in SYMPOSIUM/WORKSHOP ...
RISK ASSESSMENT AND

GOVERNMENTAL DECISION MAKING 541 (1979), hereinafter RISK SYMPOSIUM.
See Starr and Whipple, Risks of Risk Decisions, 208 SCIENCE 1116 (1980)
hereinafter Starr and Whipple, Risks; Okrent, Panel: Use of Risk Assessment, in
RISK SYMPOSIUM, supra, at 663; Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 205
SCIENCE 278 (1979). See, e.g., Cohen and Lee, A Catalogof Risks, 36 HEALTH
PHYSICS 707 (1979); Hafele, Energy, in, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
HUMAN PROSPECT, 139 (C. Starr And P. Ritterbush eds.1979). See also, M.
Maxey, ManagingLow-Level Radioactive Wastes, in, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT 410,417 (J. Watson, ed. 1979). See also, Starr,BenefitCost Studies in Sociotechnical Systems, in COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
ENGINEERING POLICY, PERSPECTIVES ON BENEFIT-RISK DECISION MAKING 26-

27 (1972). Finally, see Lave, RISK SYMPOSIUM, supra,at 484.
Although society's intuitive evaluations of given risks do not provide
sufficient grounds for arguing that these risks ought to be evaluated in a certain way,
many risk assessors maintain that correct societal evaluations are consistent with
tenet (3) and the linearity assumption. Hence, in response to alleged counterexamples
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Contemporary social scientists, especially sociologists, constitute
the third main camp of persons who are critical of lay attitudes toward
technological and environmental risk. Wildavsky and Douglas argue in
their study that Americans are biased, witchhunting opponents of
technology. They claim that laypersons are dominated by superstitions
about environmental risks and by fundamentalist desires for unrealistic
environmental "purity." Even more surprising, they allege that these
contemporary superstitions and biases are no different in kind from
those of pre-scientific, primitive people. 5
The Failure of Foundationalist Positivism
How legitimate are these three attacks on lay accounts of the
acceptability of environmental/technological risk? Dismissing the hazard
evaluations of the public is highly questionable both for specific and for
general reasons. On the specific level, the attacks are problematic
because they are premised on experts' highly stipulative, questionbegging definition of risk, as reducible merely to an average annual
probability of fatality. Most experts also presuppose, following
Bayesian accounts of decision theory, that societal or public risk
aversion is a linear function of the average annual probability of fatality
associated with the hazard. 6
to this assumption, assessors maintain that high public aversion to certain low

probability risks does not provide a counterexample to the thesis that "actual" risk
probabilities and the value of risk avoidance are linearly related, since the public's
aversion in such cases is generated by "perceived" (i.e., incorrect) risk probabilities
and not "actual" ones.
For another example of risk assessors in the employ of industry, assessors

who charge the public with being irrational, see Nealey, Excessive Fear of Nuclear
Technology, Human Affairs Research Center, Seattle, WA, 1987 (Unpublished
manuscript). For some of the dangers associated with labelling citizens as
"irrational," see Sandman, Getting to Maybe, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL
CONFLICT, 327 (R. W. Lake ed. 1987).
5

A. WILDAVSKY AND l DOUGLAS, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).

6

For an overview of risk assessment and its Bayesian foundations, see I.
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Laypeople, however, typically do not restrict risk to probability of
fatality, but include other factors, such as benefits obtained by taking the
risk, in their evaluations. Hence their risk aversion is not a linear
function of probability of fatality, since it incorporates numerous other
parameters such as degree of knowledge of the hazard, equity of risk
distribution, and so on. 7 If one accepts a more inclusive, citizen
definition of risk, then there are few grounds for alleging that laypeople
are irrational simply because they deny that environmental risk aversion
8
is a linear function of probability of fatality.
Experts' dismissing the hazard evaluations of the public is also
questionable from a more general point of view because there is no
accepted algorithm for theory choice, either in pure science (if there is
such a thing) or in assessment of technological or environmental risk.
And if there is no algorithm, the possession of which guarantees the
certainty of experts' judgments about science and technology, then there
is no completely firm basis from which to discredit similar judgments
made by laypersons. Ever since the failure of Carnap's enterprise,
epistemologists like Sellars and Quine have realized that the positivist
goal, of finding a specific rule or method to guarantee the rationality of
science or knowledge, is incapable of being achieved. 9 As a
consequence, epistemology in the late nineteen-eighties has been
naturalized. To greater and lesser degrees, philosophers have concluded
that there is no absolutely reliable method for delivering certain
knowledge, just as alchemists finally concluded, centuries before, that
there is no recipe for turning base metal or earth into gold.
SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK ANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD, Chs. One,
Two, and Six (1985).
7
See Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, Factand Fears,in SOCIETAL RISK

ASSESSMENT, 270 ff. (R. Schwing and W. Albers eds. 1970).
8
For arguments to this effect, see supra,note 6, Ch. Six.
9
See Quine, Epistemology Naturalized,in NATURALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY,
15 ff. (H. Komblith ed. 1985).
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But if there is no sacrosanct method that always guarantees
certainty, whether in science or environmental policy analysis, then our
alternative is to naturalize knowledge. On at least one version of
naturalism, this means that we must replace the positivists' question,
"how ought we to arrive at our beliefs?" with the naturalists' question,
"how do we arrive at our beliefs?" since the latter is more tractable. 10
Even Hempel, one of the grand old men of positivism, has moved to a
somewhat naturalized epistemology. He has admitted that there is no
specific rule or method to guarantee the complete objectivity of theory
choice, and he has said that science can be guided only in a general
sense and only by attempting to provide theories that embody values
such as predictive power and explanatory fertility. 11
On this naturalized account, although scientific knowledge is not
completely relative, it is unavoidably value-laden. No scientific theory
can be said to be wholly objective, but one theory is more objective
than another if it leads to better predictions or has more explanatory
power. Such judgments of objectivity depend on numerous epistemic
value judgments about particular predictions or explanations. Some of
these epistemic or methodological value judgments concern, for
example, whether the data is extensive enough or representative enough
to support a given prediction. Other epistemic value judgments affirm,
for example, that ignoring certain parameters does not jeopardize the
explanatory power of a particular account
10 See id. for discussions of naturalized epistemology. D. SHAPERE, REASON
AND THE SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE (1984), also presents a well known naturalistic
position.
11
C. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965); Hempel,
Scientific Rationality in RATIONALITY TODAY ( T. Geraets ed. 1979); Hempel,

Science andHuman Values, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE (E. Klemke, R. Hollinger, and A. Kline eds. 1982); and Hempel,
Valuation and Objectivity in Science, in PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND

PSYCHOANALYSIS (R. Cohen and L. Laudan eds. 1983).
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There is no space here to argue for or against any one of the many
variants of naturalized epistemology. Nor is there time to provide an
anatomy of the epistemic value judgments whose presence, even in
allegedly pure science, has toppled the positivist edifice of certain and
wholly objective knowledge. 12 What is more important, however, is
to trace some of the consequences, for policy about technology, if the
current wisdom about naturalized epistemology is correct.
Most obviously, if there is no specific algorithm for theory choice,
then scientific experts have no completely unassailable basis on which to
criticize the policy evaluations of the public. Granted, experts typically
have a better grasp of the mathematics and facts relevant to policy about
science and technology. The problem, however, is that even science,
and assuredly technology assessment or environmental impact analysis,
involve more than mathematics or facts; because they do, there is room
for considerable controversy over the epistemic or methodological
values in terms of which the facts and mathematics relevant to policy
analysis are interpreted. 13
Experts Are Often Wrong
That expert interpretations in the area of science and technology are
often questionable, and that there is no positivist rule to guarantee their
complete reliability, is illustrated by a recent study by hazard assessors
in the Netherlands. They used actual empirical frequencies obtained
from a study done by Oak Ridge National Laboratories to calibrate some
of the more testable subjective probabilities used in the famous
12

Scriven, The Exact Role of Value Judgments in Science, in INTRODUCTORY

READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE [E. Klemke, R. Hollinger, and A.

Kline eds. 1982); E. McMullin, Values in Science(Unpublished ms. available from
author, Philosophy Dept., U. Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556.).

13

Id. For a discussion of eistemic value judgments in science, see K.

SHRADER-FRECHETTE, SCIENCE POLICY, ETHICS, AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY, Chs. Three and Four (1985).
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Rasmussen Report, WASH-1400, probably one of the most famous and
most extensive risk assessments ever accomplished. 14 The Oak-Ridge
frequencies were obtained as part of an evaluation of operating
experience at nuclear installations. These frequencies were of various
types of mishaps involving reactor subsystems whose failure
probabilities were calculated in WASH-1400. The Oak-Ridge study
used operating experience to determine the failure probability for seven
such subsystems, and the Dutch researchers then compared these
probabilities with the 90 percent confidence bounds for the same
probabilities calculated in WASH-1400. The subsystem failures
included loss-of-coolant accidents, auxiliary feedwater-system failures,
high-pressure injection failures, long-term core-cooling failures, and
automatic depressurization-system failures for both pressurized and
boiling water reactors. Amazingly, all the values from operating
experience fell outside the 90 percent confidence bands in the WASH1400 study. However, there is only a subjective probability of ten
percent that the true value should fall outside these bands. This means
that, if the authors' subjective probabilities were well calibrated, we
should expect that approximately ten percent of the true values should lie
outside their respective bands. The fact that all the quantities fall outside
them means that WASH-1400, the most famous and allegedly best risk
assessment, is very poorly calibrated. Moreover, the fact that five of the
seven values fell above the upper confidence bound suggests that the
WASH-1400 accident probabilities, subjective probabilities, are too
low. This means that, if the Oak-Ridge data are correct, then WASH1400 exhibits a number of flaws, including an overconfidence bias. 15
Kahneman and Tversky have uncovered other biases of experts.
14 WASH-1400, supra, note 3. This figure is also a per-year, per-reactor
probability.
15
See R. COOKE, SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND EXPERT OPINION, Ch.
Nine (1986) (Manuscript to be published in 1990 by Oxford U. Press.)
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They corroborated the claim that, in the absence of an algorithm
completely guaranteeing scientific rationality, experts do not necessarily
or always make more correct judgments about the acceptability of
technological risk than do laypersons. Kahneman and Tversky showed
that virtually everyone falls victim to a number of characteristic biases in
the interpretation of statistical and probabilistic data. For example,
people often follow an intuition called representativeness, according to
which they believe samples to be very similar to one another and to the
population from which they are drawn; they also erroneously believe
that sampling is a self-correcting process. 16 In subscribing to the
representativeness bias, both experts and laypeople are insensitive: to
the prior probability of outcomes; to sample size; to the inability to
obtain a good prediction; to the inaccuracy of predictions based on
redundant and correlated input variables; and to regression toward the
mean. Nevertheless, training in elementary probability and statistics
warns against all these errors. 17
Both risk assessors and statistics experts also typically fall victim to
a bias called "availability," assessing the frequency of a class, or the
probability of an event, by the ease with which instances or occurrences
can be brought to mind. In subscribing to the availability bias, they
forget that they are judging a class on the basis of the retrievability of the
instances, and that imaginability is not a good criterion for
18
probability.
Most people also fall victim to the "anchoring" bias, making
16
See Kahneman and Tversky, Subjective Probability,in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 46 [D. Kalneman, A.Tversky, P. Slovic
eds. 1981); see also Kahneman and Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction,
id., at 68, where they show that even statistical training "does not change
fundamental intuitions about uncertainty." See especially,Tversky and Kahneman,
Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, id., at 23-31.
17 Id., at 4-11.
18 Id., at 11-14.
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estimates on the basis of adjusting values of an initial variable. In so
doing, they forget: that diverse initial starting points typically yield
different results; that insufficient adjustments can skew results; and that

probabilities of failures are typically underestimated in complex
systems. Although employing each of these biases (representativeness,
availability, and anchoring) is both economical and often effective, any
of them can lead to systematic and predictable errors. 19

These systematic and predictive errors are important because
technology and:2 0
risk assessment must be based on complex theoretical
...
analyses such as fault trees, rather than on direct experience.
Hence, despite an appearance of objectivity, these analyses
include a large component of judgment. Someone, relying
on educated intuition, must determine the structure of the
problem, the consequences to be considered, and the
importance of the various branches of the fault tree.
In other words, the risk assessor must make a number of unavoidable,
sometimes incorrect, epistemic value judgments.
Kahneman and Tversky warned that "the same type of systematic
errors," often found in the epistemic or methodological value judgments
of laypersons, "can be found in the intuitive judgments of sophisticated
scientists. Apparently, acquaintance with the theory of probability does
21
not eliminate all erroneous intuitions concerning the laws of chance."
The researchers even found that psychologists themselves, who should
know better, used their feelings of confidence in their understanding of
cases as a basis for predicting behavior and diagnosing ailments, even
though there was no correlation between their feelings of confidence and
the correctness of the judgments. 22
19

Id., at 14-20.

Supra, note 7, at 463.
Supra, note 16, at 46.
22 S. Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, in Kahneman et al.,
supra,note 16, at 287-293.
20
21
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Such revelations about the prevalence and causes of expert error are
not totally surprising since, after all, the experts have been wrong
before. They were wrong when they said that irradiating enlarged
tonsils was harmless. They were wrong when they said that x-raying
feet, to determine shoe size, was harmless. They were wrong when
they said that irradiating women's breasts, to alleviate mastitis, was
harmless. And they were wrong when they said that witnessing Abomb tests at close range was harmless. 23
For all these reasons it should not be surprising that psychometric
analysts have found, more generally, that once experts go beyond the
data and rely on value judgments, they tend to be as error-prone and
overconfident as laypeople. With respect to technological risk
assessment, psychometric researchers have concluded that experts
systematically overlook many "pathways to disaster." These include: (1)
failure to consider the way human error could cause technical systems to
fail, as at Three Mile Island; (2) overconfidence in current scientific
knowledge, such as that causing the 1976 collapse of the Teton Dam;
and (3) failure to appreciate how technical systems, as a whole,
function. For example, engineers were surprised when cargocompartment decompression destroyed control systems in some
airplanes. Experts also typically overlook: (4) slowness to detect
chronic, cumulative effects, e.g., as in the case of acid rain; (5) the
failure to anticipate inadequate human responses to safety measures,
e.g., failure of Chernobyl officials to evacuate immediately; and (6) the
inability to anticipate "common-mode" failures simultaneously afflicting
systems that are designed to be independent. A simple fire at Brown's
Ferry, Alabama, for example, damaged all five emergency core cooling
systems for the reactor.24
23
See K. SHRADER-FRECHEITE, NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY, at
98-100 (1983).
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Lessons To Be Learned From Experts' Errors
What all these cases of expert errors indicate, and what the larger
failure of the positivists' ideal of complete scientific objectivity
suggests, is that we need to reform our policymaking regarding
hazardous technology and environmental impacts. This restructuring
needs both to protect us from the most dangerous consequences of
expert error and to insure us that the laypeople most likely to be affected
by a risk have a larger voice in making public policy regarding it. To
accomplish this reform, we need to have minimum federal standards for
risk abatement and pollution control. In addition, we need to move
policymaking out of regulatory agencies and into procedures determined
by citizen negotiation or, that failing, adversary assessment.2 5 Citizen
negotiation and adversary assessment, however, presuppose that
experts do not always give us the "right" or the "rational" answers about
how safe is safe enough. Rather the public themselves must help decide
the merits of alternative answers to questions about technological and
environmental safety.
Talk about alternative answers, however, suggests that we need to
reform technology assessment, environmental impact analysis, and risk
management in at least three ways. First, instead of having experts
perform a single study, we need to develop alternative technology
assessments or environmental impact analyses, weighting them on the
basis of different value systems and different epistemic or
methodological value judgments. Second, we need to debate the merits
of these alternative analyses, each with its own interpretational and
evaluative weights. In this way citizens can decide not only what
policy they want, but also what value systems they wish to guide their
24 Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, at 475-478.
25 For more information about adversary assessment, see supra,note 13, at Ch.
Nine; for discussion of negotiation as related to technology/risk assessment, see K.
SHRADER-FRECHErE, RISK AND RATIONALITY, Ch. Thirteen (forthcoming).
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decisions. Third, in areas where assessors obviously have more
technical knowledge, e.g., of probabilities, we need to weight expert
opinion on the basis of past predictive successes. In other-words, we
need to calibrate the scientists and engineers who provide information
relevant to policy choices. Let's examine some of the reasons for each
of these moves.
Since no necessary connection exists between Pareto optimality (the
central concept of benefit-cost analysis) or Bayesian rules and socially
desirable policy,2 6 it would be helpful if there were some way to avoid
the tendency to assume that economic methods or Bayesian rules, alone,
reveal socially desirable policy. Alternatively weighted assessments
would enable persons to see that sound policy is not only a matter of
economic calculations but also a question of epistemological and ethical
analysis, as well as citizens' negotiations.
Second, ethically weighted assessments would provide a more
helpful framework for democratic decisionmaking. Weighted policy
analyses could show how different measures of social risks, costs, and
benefits might respond to changed value assumptions. 27
Third, because alternative, weighted analyses could explicitly bring
epistemic and ethical value judgments into policy considerations at a
very early stage of the process, citizens might be able to exercise more
direct control over the values to which policy gives assent. To employ a
system of alternative, ethically weighted analyses, among which
policymakers and the public can decide, would be to recognize (1)that
existing assessments already contain implicit ethical weights, and (2)
that any proponent of a particular system of ethical and epistemological
26 D. W. Pearce, Introduction, in THE VALUATION OF SOCIAL COST, 132 (D.
W. Pearce ed. 1978). This point is defended in great detail in Shrader-Frechette,
Technology Assessment as Applied Philosophy of Science, 6 SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND HUMAN VALUES 33-50 (1980).
27 This point is emphasized by Pearce, supra., at 134.
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weights ought to be required to plead her case, along with advocates of

different value positions, in the public court of reason.
A fourth reason for using alternative, ethically weighted analyses is
that it appears more desirable than the procedures likely to be adopted in
its place, e.g., using what economists and risk assessors call "revealed
preferences. "' 2 8 Rather than assuming that past preferences (based on
existing economic assumptions) are correct, using current weighting
schemes allows the public to determine what its value and policy choices
ought to be.
The purpose of introducing alternative, ethically weighted

assessments, of course, would not be to provide a prescription for
policy, but to allow the public and other decisionmakers to see how
sensitive policy conclusions are to different evaluative assumptions.
The work of Kneese et al. illustrates dramatically that what policy is

said to be technically or economically feasible or unfeasible can change
dramatically when different ethical weighting criteria are employed.2 9
28
Some of the main practitioners of the method of revealed preferences include
C. Starr, C. Whipple, and D. Okrent. See, e.g., Starr and Whipple, Risks, supra,
note 4. See also Okrent, Comment on Societal Risk, 208 SCIENCE 374 (1980).
See also C. STARR, CURRENT ISSUES IN ENERGY (1979), and D. OKRENT AND C.
WHIPPLE, APPROACH TO SOCIETAL RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND RISK

MANAGEMENT (PB-271-264 U.S. Dept. Commerce 1977). Although other means,
e.g., the method of expressed preferences, of assigning measures to RCBA
parameters have been discussed, I treat only the methods of market assignment of
values and expressed preferences since these two dominate all current RCBA practice.
On the revealed preferences' scheme, society's current revealed preferences are
determined on the basis of inductive inferences about what was allegedly preferred in
the past. This means, for example, that if, in the past, society "accepted" X number
of automobile fatalities per 100,000 miles driven, then (all things being equal, which
they never are) society will accept the same level of fatalities now. Hence, on this
theory, society "reveals" its preferences by means of past behavior which it tolerated.
For a critical perspective on the problems with the method of revealed
preferences, see supra,note 6, at 34 ff.
29
Kneese, Ben-David, and Schulze, The Ethical Foundationsof Benefit-Cost
Analysis, in ENERGY AND THE FUTURE, 59-74 ( D. Maclean and P. G. Brown
eds. 1982). A. V. KNEESE, S. BEN-DAVID, AND W. D. SCHULZE, A STUDY OF
THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
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Apart from the arguments for experimenting with different ethically
weighted systems, there are a number of reasons for mandating that
several alternative assessments be done for each project involving the
imposition of public or societal risk. First,successful decisionmaking
depends in part on knowing all the relevant facts and seeing all sides of
a given "story." It is more likely that all sides to a story will be revealed
if different groups, using different weights, do hazard analyses, than if
only one project team performs only one study. The necessity of seeing
different "sides" is borne out by wide divergences among the
conclusions of different assessments of the same risk. Various studies
of liquefied natural gas risks for Oxnard, California, for example,
differed by three orders of magnitude. 30
Second, consumers have a right to free, informed consent to the
technological and environmental risks imposed on them, just as they
have analogous rights in the area of medical ethics. 3 1 If generating
alternative analyses helps to insure that all sides to a policy controversy
are heard, then it likely also helps to insure that public consent to risk is
genuinely informed.
Third, all risks are value laden, and all hazard analyses employ
judgmental strategies and epistemic or methodological value judgments.
As a result, there are no wholly objective risk assessments. But if not,
then technology assessment and risk analysis are in part subjective and
likely to be highly politicized. And if so, then they ought to be
accomplished in a political and legal arena where citizens and their
representatives are able to recognize the consequences of alternative
(Unpublished report, to the National Science Foundation, Program in Ethics and
Values in Science and Technology, August, 1979).
30 Kunreuther, Linnerooth, et al., A Decision-ProcessPerspective on Risk and
Policy Analysis, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT 261 (R. W. Lake ed.
1987).
31
For an analysis of some problems with consent as related to technology/risk
assessment, see supra,note 6, at Ch. Four.
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assessments. Citizens also need to be able to recognize which
assessments are likely to give the most consideration to their interests.
Only if the naive positivists were correct in their belief (that there
was a value-free algorithm guaranteeing theory choice) would it make
sense to perform only one hazard analysis. Since they are not correct,
and since "acceptable risk" or "reasonable policy" involves both
procedural and ethical dimensions, as well as scientific ones, we need
alternative assessments to capture the various ethical and political values
32

informing public policy.

On the new account of technology assessment and risk management
that I want to defend, increasing the degree of analytical sophistication is
not sufficient either for enfranchising the public or for resolving policy
controversies. As environmental conflict over the proposed Cornwall
facility demonstrated, expanded research efforts seldom are able to
produce dispositive policy information.
And if not, then
decisionmakers must rely on procedural and democratic, rather than
merely scientific, methods of assessing and managing risk. 33
A fourth reason for performing alternative risk analyses, each with
different methodological and ethical assumptions, is that there are
numerous uncertainties in hazard assessment. Some of these
uncertainties are evident in the wide margins- of probabilistic error
demonstrated in the Netherlands' study of WASH-1400, already
mentioned.
In addition to preparing alternative assessments to represent different
citizens' views, another methodological device for improving hazard
analysis and technology assessment is to weight expert opinions. This
suggestion amounts to giving more credence to experts whose risk
32
See supra, note 13, Ch. 9.
33
See Barnthouse, et al., PopulationBiology in the Courtroom: the Hudson
River Controversy, 34 BIOSCIENCE 17-18 (1984).
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estimates have been vindicated by past predictive success. By
weighting expert opinions, analysts would have a way to exercise
probabilistic control over them. They could attempt to determine
whether a hazard assessor (who provides a subjective probability for
some accident or failure rate) is "well calibrated." (A subjective
probability assessor can be said to be well calibrated if for every
probability value r in the class of all events to which the assessor
assigns subjective probability r, the relative frequency with which these
34
events occur is equal to r.
The primary justification for checking the "calibration" of
technology and risk assessors is that use of scientific methodology
requires "testing" the risk probabilities estimated by experts, especially
since there is a wide divergence of opinion as to their actual values. In
the famous WASH-1400 study of nuclear-reactor safety, for example,
thirty experts were asked to estimate failure probabilities for sixty
components, e.g., the rupture probability of a high quality steel pipe of
diameter greater than three inches, per section-hour. On the WASH1400 study, the average spread over the sixty components was
167,820. (The spread of these thirty expert opinions, for a given
component, is the ratio of the largest to the smallest estimate.) In the
same study, another disturbing fact was that the probability estimates of
the thirty experts were not independent; if an expert was a pessimist
with respect to one component, then there was a tendency for him to be
a pessimist with respect to other components as well. Both the spread
of expert opinions and their lack of independence suggest that it would
be important to calibrate them, if we are interested in realistic technology
assessment and policy analysis. 35
34
35

Cooke, supra,note 15.
Id., Ch. 2.
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A Model for Methodological Improvement and Objectivity
in Technology Assessment and Risk Analysis:
Scientific Proceduralilsm
So far, I have argued that we ought to reform technology
assessment and quantified risk analysis by using ethical and
methodological weighting techniques, performing alternative
assessments, and calibrating expert opinions. All of these
methodological suggestions for improving technology assessment and
risk management are predicated on two views: (1)that assessors ought to
give up the rigid, anti-naturalistic, naive positivist assumption that
expert assessments are wholly objective and value free, and (2) that
contemporary technology/risk assessment needs to become more
democratic, more open to control by the public, and more responsive to
populist and procedural accounts of rational policy analysis and risk
management.
What now remains to be established is how to safeguard scientific
rationality and objectivity, even though technology assessment/risk
assessment methods need to take account of democratic, procedural,
ethical, and political factors, viz., populist factors allegedly not capable
of being handled in purely rational and narrowly objective ways. Such
a procedural account of technology assessment and hazard management
presupposes that rationality and objectivity, in their final stages, require
an appeal to particular cases as similar to other cases believed to be
correct. This is what legal reasoning requires, just as Aristotle
recognized, rather than an appeal only to scientific method.
The key to this procedural account of technology assessment, policy
analysis, and risk management is Aristotle's belief that there are no
explicit rules for ethical or value judgments. Instead we must use
inexplicit and general rules to guide our moral reasoning. Aristotle
believed that we came to know these inexplicit rules by relying on the
ability of a group of people, similarly brought up, to see certain cases as
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like others. This is also what Wittgensteinians are disposed to believe
about all instances of human learning.
At the final level of technology assessment and risk management,
Aristotle and Wittgenstein must be correct. Ultimately even rules must
give way, not to further appeals to specific scientific rules, as the naive
positivists and many scientists presuppose, but to a shared appreciation
of similarities between cases. 36
As such, this Popperian and Wittgensteinian account (scientific
proceduralism) anchors objectivity to a legal, rather than a scientific,
model of knowing and to a largely procedural, rather than substantive,
account of rational assessment. Criticisms made by the scientific and
lay community likely to be affected by a given risk, technology, or
environmental impact would help to safeguard the procedural and
democratic aspects of rational technology/risk assessment. Calibration
of expert opinions and sensitivity analyses would help to safeguard its
predictive and scientific components, viz., its rationality and objectivity.
This sketch of the scientific objectivity characteristic of a more
populist notion of technology/risk assessment is premised on the
Popperian assumption that open, critical, and methodologically
pluralistic approaches (via citizen participation, alternative assessments,
sensitivity analyses, calibration, and ethical/methodological weighting
schemes) come closest to revealing the theoretical, linguistic, and
cultural invariants of reality, much as a plurality of experimental
perspectives helps reveal the invariants of quantum mechanical systems.
Conclusion
On the view that I am suggesting, what are the relevant variance
principles applicable to technology assessment and hazard management?
36 See B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMJrS OF PHILOSOPHY 97-98;
(1985).
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These principles are that risk behavior or science policy is rational and
objective if it survives criticism by various communities of citizens and
experts, each with different transformations or evaluations of the same
hazard. 37 Arriving at rational policy, on this account, requires an
epistemology in which what we ought to believe about technology
assessment and risk analysis is bootstrapped onto how we ought to act.
That is, we ought to act in ways that permit open criticism, that
recognize due-process rights, that give equal consideration to the
interests of all persons, and so on. Acting in this way, however, is a
matter of realizing that the constraints or invariants in hazard analysis are
in part realized through normative judgments. This is because the
constraints must be implemented in institutional forms recognizing
values such as equal treatment and informed consent. This means that
rational assessment, on the view defended here, is irreducibly political
in much the same sense that quantum mechanics is irreducibly statistical.
But if so, then any account of rational technology assessment or policy
analysis is as much a part of politics as science. 38

37 For a similar view, see D. G. Holdsworth, Objectivity, Scientific Theories
and the Perception of Risk (Unpublished paper available from author at Ontario
Hydroelectric, Toronto, CANADA.).

38 See D. G. Holdsworth, Objectivity and Control, (Unpublished paper
available from author at Ontario Hydroelectric, Toronto, CANADA.).
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